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Science at the Crossroads by Herbert Dingle Select Quotations [CG addenda in blue text; page numbers refer to the pdf here] |
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Preface
[Dingle reveals the general modus operandi of responses from the scientific community to his criticism, including the creation of strawman arguments. Readers may be familiar with the ploy as applied to other issues covered on this website.]
.... the ultimate reaction, coming from an eminent mathematical physicist or astronomer, is simply a paraphrase of what this book will show to have been every other supposedly authoritative response during that long time - namely, first an evasion of the point by its transformation into something different, for the refutation of which justification is claimed on grounds too abstruse for general presentation; and secondly, complete silence when the transformation is exposed and an answer to the genuine, easily understandable, criticism requested. [p.4]
The devotion to truth at all costs has gradually given place - largely unconsciously, I believe, but still undeniably - to the blind pursuit of the superficially plausible; the direction towards the most seductive, in which advance has been easiest, has been taken without regard to preservation of contact with the base, which is the truth of experience and reason; the verdict of those authorities falls on deaf ears .... [p.4]
.... mathematics has been transformed from the servant of experience into its master, and instead of enabling the full implications and potentialities of the facts of experience to be realised and amplified, it has been held necessarily to symbolise truths which are in fact sheer impossibilities (but are presented to the layman as discoveries) which, though they appear to him absurd, are nevertheless true because mathematical inventions, which he cannot understand require them. The situation is precisely equivalent to that in which the zoologist assured the astonished spectator of the giraffe that if he understood anatomy he would know that such a creature was impossible — except that, in physical science, the layman usually believes what he is told and, unless he is enlightened in time, will be the victim of the consequences. This phenomenon, most evident in relation to special relativity, is now common in physical science, especially in cosmology, but its culminating point lay, I think, in the acceptance of special relativity, and it is with that alone that the present discussion is concerned. [p.5]
It is ironical that, in the very field in which Science has claimed superiority to Theology, for example - in the abandoning of dogma and the granting of absolute freedom to criticism - the positions are now reversed .... Unless scientists can be awakened to the situation into which they have lapsed, the future of science and civilisation is black indeed. [p.5] [cf. with Professor Phillip E. Johnson's assessment (in his book "Darwin on Trial") of "Science" in relation to evolution theory (here)]
It is certain that, sooner or later, experiments based on false theories will have unexpected results, and these, in the experiments of the present day, may be harmless or incalculably disastrous. [p.5]
Introduction
I can present the matter most briefly by saying that a proof that Einstein's special theory of relativity is false has been advanced; and ignored, evaded, suppressed and, indeed, treated in every possible way except that of answering it, by the whole scientific world .... [p.6]
The reason why this has happened is largely that which will, in all probability, immediately strike the reader — namely, that the theory of relativity is believed to be so abstruse that only a very select body of specialists can be expected to understand it. In fact this is quite false; the theory itself is very simple, but it has been quite unnecessarily enveloped in a cloak of metaphysical obscurity which has really nothing whatever to do with it; the physical theory itself, indeed, is much simpler than many physical theories familiar to most educated non-scientific but interested persons in the nineteenth century; it is wholly devoid of any mystical significance. [p.6]
.... the great majority of physical scientists, including practically all those who conduct experiments in physics and are best known to the world as leaders in science, when pressed to answer allegedly fatal criticism of the theory, confess either that they regard the theory as nonsensical but accept it because the few mathematical specialists in the subject say they should do so, or that they do not pretend to understand the subject at all, but, again, accept the theory as fully established by others and therefore a safe basis for their experiments. The response of the comparatively few specialists to the criticism is either complete silence or a variety of evasions couched in mystical language which succeeds in convincing the experimenters that they are quite right in believing that the theory is too abstruse for their comprehension and that they may safely trust men endowed with the metaphysical and mathematical talents that enable them to write confidently in such profound terms. What no one does is to answer the criticism. [p.7]
It would naturally be supposed that the point at issue, even if less esoteric than it is generally supposed to be, must still be too subtle and profound for the ordinary reader to be expected to understand it. On the contrary, it is of the most extreme simplicity. According to the theory, if you have two exactly similar clocks, A and B, and one is moving with respect to the other, they must work at different rates .... one works more slowly than the other. But the theory also requires that you cannot distinguish which clock is the 'moving' one; it is equally true to say that A rests while B moves and that B rests while A moves. The question therefore arises: how does one determine, consistently with the theory, which clock works the more slowly? Unless this question is answerable, the theory unavoidably requires that A works more slowly than B and B more slowly than A - which it requires no super-intelligence to see is impossible. Now, clearly, a theory that requires an impossibility cannot be true, and scientific integrity requires, therefore, either that the question just posed shall be answered, or else that the theory shall be acknowledged to be false. [p.7]
The question is by-passed, and the reader is led into a slough of metaphysical concepts which have nothing whatever to do with it. Nevertheless, the statement serves to confirm the experimenters' conviction that the matter is beyond their understanding but has been competently dealt with by an expert authority, so they need give it no further attention. [p.8]
It is no doubt generally believed that means exist for preventing the occurrence of such a situation as this, and theoretically, of course, they do. The Royal Society is a body whose function includes the safeguarding of scientific integrity in all matters, and especially those vital to public welfare in this country (the situation is of general significance, of course, but for reasons of space I deal in this book almost wholly with Britain), and accordingly, after great difficulty in overcoming the interposed obstacles, the criticism was submitted to it for consideration. It was rejected on the basis of a report from an anonymous 'specialist' that the fallacy invalidating it was too elementary even to be instructive. The 'fallacy', however, was not revealed, nor was the simple but crucial question answered, but the customary paragraphs of mystical comment were supplied, and these satisfied the Society that the criticism was baseless. A letter to the leading scientific journal, Nature, asking, in the public interest and in accordance with the principles of the Society, that the fallacy should be published, was refused publication, on the ground that actions of the Royal Society were not open to question in Nature. An attempt was made to obtain a ruling of the Press Council (one of whose functions is 'to keep under review developments likely to restrict the supply of information of public interest and importance') on this refusal of Nature - not, be it noted, merely on this instance, but on the general decision of the editor that no action of the Royal Society, whatever its relation to the public interest, was open to questioning in the journal - but the officers of the Council would not allow the inquiry to reach it. [p.8]
Part One - The Moral Issue |
Chapter 1 - The Basic Principles of Science
Dingle selects the following statement of Sir Henry Dale - a President of the Royal Society in bygone days - as a paradigm expression of scientific integrity:
And science, we should insist, better than any other discipline, can hold up to its students and followers an ideal of patient devotion to the search for objective truth, with vision unclouded by personal or political motive, not tolerating any lapse from precision or neglect of any anomaly, fearing only prejudice and preconception, accepting nature's answers humbly and with courage, and giving them to the world with an unflinching fidelity. The world cannot afford to lose such a contribution to the moral framework of its civilisation. [p.11]
.... it may be said that the aim of science is to discover what actually exists in nature and to express the relations between natural phenomena in rational form, i.e. in statements which, when established by sufficient evidence and found to hold good over a sufficiently wide range of experience, we call laws of nature, and when less completely supported but still possessing some measure of plausibility, we call theories or hypotheses. The evidence is never complete, and experience is never exhaustive, so all these statements are subject to change, but, however tenaciously scientists may wish to retain those which they have learned to trust, there is a finality about both experience and reason that ultimately overrides all opposition and forces the scientist to acknowledge the error of his preconceptions, however reluctant he may be to do so. p.12
The pioneers of that movement - Galileo and Newton in particular- indeed insisted on the primacy of experience, but they relied no less than the Schoolmen on faithful obedience to the demands of reason in their ordering of experience and their deductions from what it revealed. Galileo has been criticised for his reasoning from 'thought experiments', and not only were these 'experiments', which were a novelty at that time, but also they involved rational thought and permitted nothing that violated the strict rules of reasoning. p.13
But what gradually developed later, as a result of the greater degree of conviction that an experimental result brought with it, was a permissiveness in the framing of hypotheses, arising from the certainty that, if they were wrong, experiment would inevitably reveal that fact, and there was always a chance that, however improbable they might seem, they might turn out to be right .... There is much that can be said in defence of this - or at least there was - so long as the hypotheses are recognised for what they are - namely, a means of arriving at truth and not truth itself. p.13
In a recent paper, two physicists, 0.Bilaniuk and E.C.G. Sudarshan, write: 'There is an unwritten precept in modern physics... which states that in physics "anything which is not prohibited is compulsory" .... it is evident from the context that 'prohibited' means mathematically impossible. p.13
It was particularly Galileo who realised that mathematics provided the most effective terms in which to express physical observations, and it was he who contributed most to the introduction of those terms into science. The book of nature, he wrote, 'is written in the mathematical language'. p.15
.... a language is a medium for expressing ideas, and it is just as capable of expressing false ideas as true ones. The fact, therefore, that something can be expressed with rigorous mathematical exactitude tells you nothing at all about its truth, i.e. about its relation to nature, or to what we can experience. p.16
.... the habit has developed of assuming that a physical theory is necessarily sound if its mathematics is impeccable: the question whether there is anything in nature corresponding to that impeccable mathematics is not regarded as a question; it is taken for granted.
The fact is, however, that mathematical truths are far more general than physical truths: that is to say, the symbols that compose a mathematical expression may, with equal mathematical correctness, correspond both to that which is observable and that which is purely imaginary or even unimaginable. p.16
Dingle explains that of the three solutions provided by mathematics for the equation x3 = 8, only one corresponds to something in nature, namely a cube with sides of length 2. The other two solutions are called "complex" or "imaginary" numbers and have no correspondence in the natural or physical world.
So we just ignore two of the mathematical solutions, and quite overlook the significance of that fact - namely, that in the language of mathematics we can tell lies as well as truths, and within the scope of mathematics itself there is no possible way of telling one from the other. We can distinguish them only by experience or by reasoning outside the mathematics, applied to the possible relation between the mathematical solution and its supposed physical correlate. [p.17]
On some reasons why so-called experimental proofs of special relativity are fallacious:
..... it may be said at once that the apparently simplest way of exposing it - by setting two clocks in relative motion and observing their rates - is impracticable because the difference which the theory requires is too small to be detected except at velocities far too high to be yet attainable. Experiments have been made in which elementary electrically charged particles (conceptual bodies, such as electrons, protons, etc.) have been used instead of clocks, and observations of what have been regarded as their 'rates' have been made, and these have shown that such 'rates' differ for particles which, according to electromagnetic theory, have vastly different velocities. These observations have been held to constitute an experimental proof that the Lorentz transformation is a physically valid solution of our problem. But there are two reasons why this argument fails. In the first place, even if it be fully granted, it shows only that one 'clock' works more slowly than the other - which would be quite possible if the motion of each was absolute, as Lorentz showed before Einstein's special relativity theory appeared. If the motion is relative, however, and the Lorentz transformation is a valid solution, then also the second 'clock' must work more slowly than the first - and this, it need hardly be said, has been left unproved. The second reason for the failure of the argument is that the interpretation of the particles as 'clocks' and of the observed phenomena as their 'rates', and the assumption that they move with velocities, ascribed to them (it is, of course, quite impossible to observe them; their existence and properties have all to be inferred on theoretical grounds) depend on the truth of a theory that itself depends on the truth of the Lorentz transformation (this is explained in Part Two), so the argument is circular: the observation proves the physical truth of the Lorentz transformation only if we first accept a theory which itself requires that transformation to be physically true. [p.18] [emphasis CG]
An experimental test of this requirement of the special relativity theory is therefore at present impracticable, and the claims often advanced that such a test has been made are spurious. But surely, one does not need an experiment to prove that one clock cannot at the same time work both faster and slower than another. And this brings me to the most serious aspect of this whole matter. How is it possible that such an obvious absurdity should not only have ever been believed but should have been maintained and made the basis of almost the whole of modern physics for more than half a century; and that, even when pointed out, its recognition should have been universally and strenuously resisted, in defiance of all reason and all the traditions and principles of science expressed by Sir Henry Dale in the statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter? [p.19]
.... the more serious lapse is the moral one, not only because of the intrinsically greater seriousness of a moral as compared with an intellectual fault, but also because the nature of science itself does not ensure its eventual correction as it does when the mistake is intellectual. [p.19]
Chapter 2 - The Origin of the Controversy
Dingle divides the field of physical science into two classes which he describes as 'experimenters' and 'mathematicians':
.... the reactions to my question from the 'experimenters' are, with almost complete unanimity, either that they do not understand [special relativity theory], at all, although they assume it in their experiments, or else that they regard it as nonsensical; they take it to be true, nevertheless, in their experiments which depend on it with various degrees of directness, and justify this procedure on the ground that the theory has been tested by those who understand it (i.e. the 'mathematicians'), and therefore all questions about it should be passed to them. [p.21]
This may seem to the uninitiated so incredible, in view of the popular image of the scientist which corresponds to Dale's description - I know from experience that it does so appear - that I am forced in my examples (which, however, will not include the least reputable ones) to give the names of those whom I quote. I do this with the greatest reluctance, but it is clearly necessary. [p.22]
The leaders in the subject reply, if at all, only when pressed, and as briefly as possible. Those of intermediate status cite experiments of greater or less irrelevance or present calculations of greater or less complication and with no relevance at all. Students and young Ph.D.s are vociferous. [p.22]
I think this shows how, even in science, what at its beginnings is recognised as a speculation, with greater or less plausibility, develops with time into a compulsory dogma, which whosoever disbelieves thereby brands himself as an ignorant fool. [p.22]
I quoted verbatim from Einstein's paper his proof that, according to his theory, a 'moving' clock, B, worked more slowly than a 'stationary' clock, A, and then gave, in exactly the same form, a proof that, in exactly the same circumstances, clock A worked more slowly than clock B. 'The conclusion of the first passage', I wrote, 'is that each reading of B is behind the corresponding reading of A, and that of the second passage is that each reading of A is behind the corresponding reading of B.' Applying the result to a particular case, I concluded: 'Hence, when B reads 6, A reads both 12 and 3. That is a contradiction. To avoid this outcome it must be explained not why the two cases are different - that is obvious - but why, consistently with the theory, the former result must be accepted as true while the latter must be rejected as false. [p.24]
What I showed was that it had two mutually contradictory answers, equally authentic, of which Einstein had given only one which had been accepted as uniquely valid. [p.25]
Dingle tried two distinct approaches in his quest to enlighten the scientific community about the fundamental flaw in special relativity theory. These differed only in their form of expression. The first approach was in the form of a statement and the second in the form of a question. They can be found in detail on p.27:
Put more specifically, I could have pointed out that the theory contained a contradiction - that it required each of two clocks to work faster than the other - or asked the question: how does one tell from the theory which clock works the faster? .... Unfortunately, throughout most of the controversy I took the first course .... As soon as I took the other course, however (the asking of a question), the effect was completely opposite; instead of bringing on myself a flood of discordant 'refutations' I was met by complete silence. [p.26]
I think the difference is most instructive - a deluge of evasive replies in one case and total silence in the other. [p.27]
Chapter 3 - Reactions to Criticism
I had been prepared for objections on scientific grounds to the arguments which I had advanced: I had not been prepared for the lapse from scientific integrity which the various evasions and distortions of the simple point at issue showed to be so general, and it became clear to me that this was an even more serious matter than the tenability of special relativity itself. [p.29]
The fact must be plainly stated that, in a situation in which the safety of the world lies in the hands of a comparatively minute body of men whose activities are necessarily so abstruse as to be altogether beyond the comprehension of the vast majority, the obligation that rests on them to honour unreservedly the traditional scientific principle of utter subservience to truth and rejection of prejudice is one of which they are quite unaware. [p.30]
The automatic reaction to criticism is not to face it but to look elsewhere for some independent justification for ignoring it. The depth to which we have descended is exposed .... by one ardent believer in the relativity theory .... who asserts that criticisms of that theory are symptoms of mental abnormality and that to treat them seriously is a waste of time. That this - though not usually so candidly acknowledged - truly describes the general attitude I have overwhelming evidence .... [p.31]
In his quest to have his criticism addressed properly and honestly by the scientific establishment, Dingle seeks the aid of biologist, Julian Huxley. Followers of this website may recall that Huxley features in our discussion (here) of the Darwinian creation story. In light of what we have seen in that article, Dingle was perhaps more than a little naive (or optimistic) to ask Huxley for help. Or perhaps he was wise enough to ensure that Huxley's response would be recorded for posterity:
I confess that it surprised me to learn that a Huxley should be deterred from urging that the ethical obligations of scientists should be honoured, by the fear of provoking disrespectful irrelevant comment, but the reply showed once more the paralysing effect, on the intellects of even leading thinkers, of the word 'relativity'. I had not asked Sir Julian to comment on relativity, but only to help to ensure that criticism should be met, and not evaded or ignored, yet his immediate reaction was to explain why he had never tried to understand it. The magical influence of this word has transformed science in this field into a superstition as powerful as any to be found in primitive tribes. [p.33]
Dingle explains one of the rules that the Royal Society has in place ostensibly to protect scientific integrity; rules which it conspicuously disregarded when it came to Dingle's criticism of Einsteinian theory:
.... the [Royal] Society in earlier days was very conscious of the greater danger resulting from rejection of the truth than from publication of error (as I have already pointed out, the very nature of scientific investigation ensures that error must inevitably reveal itself sooner or later), and it made a rule, which is still held to be binding on referees of papers, which requires that 'a paper should not be recommended for rejection merely because the referee disagrees with the opinions or conclusions it contains, unless fallacious reasoning or experimental error is unmistakably evident'. In other words, a paper is not required to prove its innocence; it is held to be innocent unless proved guilty. [p.34]
It is easy to see how necessary such a rule is, if the basic aim of the Society - the discovery of truth - is to be achieved, for without it the most dangerous of all errors - those universally held - are automatically preserved from discovery. [p.34]
Before a paper can be considered by a referee of the Royal Society it must be "communicated" by a Fellow of the Society. Of course this provides a loophole by which papers deemed inconvenient or dissonance-provoking can be ignored. Dingle must therefore find a way to get past this first obstacle, after which he is ostensibly protected by more objectively defined parameters, or so he believes. The requirement of "communication" by a Fellow is significant because of the implications for scientific thought in general, not just Dingle's criticism.
There is only one means by which this obviously desirable and originally intended object of the Society may be circumvented: there is nothing to require that a Fellow of the Society shall submit a paper to it, whatever the import of that paper may be. If he does so, the referee is bound, if he fulfils his obligation, to pass it if an error in it is not 'unmistakably evident' - not merely suspected, but clear beyond doubt - but there is nothing to ensure that it shall ever reach a referee. [p.34] [emphasis CG]
According to the Royal Society's rules for publication of papers Dingle asks a Fellow of the Society, Kathleen Lonsdale, to read his paper containing his criticism of special relativity theory so that she might "communicate" it to the Society's "referees" for the next step in the process.
I then approached Kathleen Lonsdale, who was not only a former colleague at University College London but also a close personal friend. Her work also was only indirectly related to relativity, and she shared the general belief in its essentially mysterious essence in even greater measure than most, for it had been presented to her in her student days cloaked in such metaphysical irrelevancies that, being naturally predisposed to ascribe the appearance of nonsense in the instruction of her tutors to her own incompetence rather than to actual fact, she had been rendered unable to hear the word 'relativity' and retain her power of simple reasoning. [p.35]
.... the more distinguished and the more mentally honest and the more concerned in their work with the special theory of relativity the experimental physical scientists may be, the more convinced they are that the theory is unintelligible to them. What they cannot transcend is the conviction that the 'mathematicians' do understand it and cannot be wrong: they choose to believe themselves fools rather than that. [p.36]
Lonsdale communicates the paper to the Royal Society who are now duty bound to submit it to their referees for assessment. Their response is outrageous. A fallacy in the criticism is cited by one referee as the reason for rejection of Dingle's paper, but the fallacy itself is not identified. Dingle summarises the referees' response:
There were comments on details, but on the essential point the conclusion of one referee was: 'In some cases of this type publication might still be justified because the alleged objections and the arguments which have to be used to deal with them may be instructive. However, in the present case the fallacy is so elementary that I must recommend the rejection of the paper.' The other referee merely wrote: 'Although he has much to say which is of interest to historians of science and which might with advantage be published elsewhere, my view is that the Society would make itself ridiculous by publishing this paper.' [p.36]
Chapter 4 - Attitude of the Press
Dingle writes to John Maddox, the editor of leading scientific journal, Nature :
I write this letter, as a member of the public and as spokesman for those who have expressed to me their grave misgiving at the state in which this matter now stands, to request that the Royal Society shall publish in Nature a statement of the fallacy in the argument expressed in my letter in this journal and summarised above; or, alternatively, acknowledge that there is in fact no fallacy .... [p.40]
To avoid a spurious response Dingle makes it clear that a valid refutation of his criticism can only be on one of two grounds: one, that it is somehow permissible to calculate the rate ratio of two clocks A and B by the interval of A corresponding to the interval of B, but not visa versa, or two that an algebraic error has been made in the second calculation. He concludes:
.... any presentation of [the argument] that does not show one of these things, or transforms it into something expressible only in comparatively recondite terms, would be ipso facto a clear indication that the point was not being met. [p.40]
Maddox refuses to publish Dingle's letter to Nature in which he challenged the Royal Society to divulge the "fallacy" they had supposedly found in his paper, but refused to identify. Dingle comments:
It appeared to me impossible to reconcile the principles on which the Royal Society was founded with its refusal to make public a piece of pure scientific knowledge - namely, the fallacy in my argument, which it had accepted, on the authority of its chosen referees, as established - and with its exemption from questioning in the leading scientific journal. [p.41]
Dingle now writes to the Press Council. Referring to Maddox he reports:
[Maddox] has, in a leading article, charged me with acting 'immodestly' in questioning the integrity of scientists who persistently refuse to answer informed criticism but proceed with their experiments as though the criticism had not been made, and - although his statement is too obscure to convey a precise meaning - gives a strong impression that one's duty in such circumstances, no matter how convinced one may be that a serious error is being made, is to remain silent and, in effect, admit the unauthenticated infallibility of the majority.
and also:
He has persistently refrained from publishing letters - by others as well as me - which have a direct bearing on the point at issue, and has sought to justify repeated postponements by a series of excuses which, however regarded, can have no respectable explanation. [p.42]
Also in a letter to the Press Council:
The new scientific age has unavoidably made public safety dependent on the incomprehensible and uncontrollable activities of scientists, who have therefore now an additional obligation to preserve the utmost integrity in their work. [p.45]
Dingle summarises the effect of his efforts to have Nature and the Press Council address the refusal of the Royal Society to state clearly the "fallacy" which they claimed was the basis of their refusal to publish Dingle's criticism of special relativity theory:
The net result of this effort, then, was to bring to light the following facts, on which I make no comment but which I leave to the consideration of the reader:
(1) The actions of the Royal Society, no matter what evidence there may be of their potential public danger, are not open to informed questioning in the scientific press.
(2) It is not possible to submit to the Press Council an inquiry clearly coming within its terms of reference. [p.47]
Dingle writes a letter which he sends to various Fellows of the Royal Society; excerpts follow:
This disproof of special relativity is so plainly conclusive that no one guided by reason can doubt it; but also it is so unexpected that no one guided by prejudice can believe it. Those called upon to comment therefore cannot produce a refutation, but fear that, if they accept the disproof, someone will discover a flaw, which has escaped them and their incapacity will be exposed; hence they keep silent ....
and,
The Royal Society, the supreme scientific body in this country, can freely violate its foundation principles (as in fact it is doing) and the public, whose servant it is, cannot question it, however clearly the abuse may be perceived and established. Such are the spirit and the conditions in which scientists, in this country at least, assume the responsibilities, which the new scientific age lays upon them ....
and also,
I shall be able to expose a situation that would profoundly shock those holding the popular belief in the disinterestedness of scientific research. I do not overlook the probable consequences, both immediate and by repercussion, of such action, and for various reasons, both personal and general, I would do anything possible honourably to avoid it, but since the only alternative that has now been left to me is passive acquiescence in a course of degradation which, if unchecked, must eventually lead to moral and physical disaster, I have no real choice. [pp.48-49]
On the matter of specifying the danger involved, I can only say that if this could be foreseen, steps could be taken to prevent it, but since we know only of what character this might be, it seems wiser to start at the shadow than passively to await the arrival of the substance casting it. [p.50]
An eminent mathematician, Professor J. L. Synge, of the Dublin Institute of Advanced Studies, is one of the few prominent members of the scientific community to attempt to address Dingle's criticism of special relativity. An excerpt from his letter to Nature follows:
As the result of a lengthy correspondence with Professor Dingle, I am of the opinion that the contradiction described by him in Nature .... is due to the incompatibility of
(a) the concepts used in the special theory of relativity as ordinarily understood, and
(b) the concept of clocks that run regularly, as understood by Professor Dingle.
I believe that Professor Dingle agrees that this is a correct diagnosis of the cause of the contradiction. To resolve it, one must abandon either (a) or (b). Since (b), as elucidated in our correspondence, is equivalent to Newton's concept of absolute time, and since relativistic physics appears to me to represent nature more closely than Newtonian physics does, I cast my vote for the abandonment of (b) and the retention of (a) .... [p.51] [Dingle notes with disappointment that Synge effectively reduces the question to the level of a decidedly unscientific "vote".]
Dingle's response to Synge is suppressed by the editor of Nature, John Maddox. Dingle writes:
Now I think it is clear that this opened the way to a final solution, for my conception of a regularly-running clock was that generally accepted in physics, my only relevant demand of it here being that one such clock should not be able to run steadily both faster and slower than another. I did not think it likely that this would be disputed, and if not, then, according to Synge's own statement, the special theory of relativity would have to be abandoned. I wrote at once to Nature, feeling that the long drawn out controversy was at last about to be ended. I was wrong: my reply was not published, and still, more than three years later, it remains unpublished, despite requests to the editor for it from various sources, some of which will be mentioned in due course. Meanwhile, the special theory of relativity continues to be used as though it had never been questioned. [p.51,&52]
... the one essential thing that he [Maddox] would not do, or explain why he would not do, was to publish my reply to Synge. Inevitably, readers of Nature, unaware of all this, concluded that I had no reply to make, and, as we shall see later in connection with a correspondence in the Listener, I was chided for my neglect. [p.52]
While this matter was proceeding, but quite independently, I received a letter from New Scientist, inviting me to contribute 'freely' to a series of articles about 'possible future developments in science and technology, particularly those likely to have substantial effects on society'. 'We give our contributors,' they wrote, no formal brief whatever other than that they should discuss and speculate on any trends or developments in science, the future effects of which they find worrying, exciting or intriguing in some way.' [p.53]
After receiving a written contribution from Dingle that they had requested, the science journal, New Scientist, makes excuses for not publishing it when the content is found by them to be unconventional/controversial. A spokesman writes back to Dingle returning his article:
I do, however, appreciate that if your ideas are correct they are a matter of no little significance. But they have now been subjected to some discussion in Nature, a journal of more learned standing than ours, and have not, apparently, succeeded in convincing experts who are far better equipped to assess them than ourselves. Because New Scientist has no system for refereeing contributions we are always reluctant to champion points of view which, for technical reasons, we cannot evaluate. I agree that your treatment at the hands of the Royal Society and Nature appears tardy and that both should certainly be accountable to the public. However, I would take issue over the third point of your summary: 'refutation' of a theory surely depends on the consensus of scientific opinion? Professor McCrea has pointed out what he considers to be the fallacy in your disproof. May not the absence of further reaction from the scientific world simply signify silent acquiescence with his explanation? After all, scientists are not known for loquacity.
That a simpler answer, fit for the man in the street, is not forthcoming may be, I feel, because relativity is too difficult an idea in itself. [p.54]
Dingle comments prophetically on the decision of New Scientist not to publish his contribution:
I leave it to the reader to contemplate this reply in relation to the terms of the unprompted invitation extended to me, and the view that ' "refutation" of a theory surely depends on the consensus of scientific opinion' in relation to Sir Henry Dale's somewhat different view, remarking only that, whatever the result of his contemplation, it is certainly New Scientist's view of the criterion by which theories should be judged that operates today. Whether 'nature's answers', which will decide his fate, will be determined by 'the consensus of scientific opinion' is another matter, which also will bear contemplation. [p.54]
Dingle's writes to the American Journal, Science , outlining for them his criticism of special relativity:
My conclusion is that the theory must be false, since it demands that each of two clocks works faster than the other, which is impossible. Otherwise, something must determine which clock really works the faster. What is that something? I ask authorities on the subject either to identify it in terms intelligible to anyone who can understand the question, or else to acknowledge that the theory is false.
Science replies:
We have consulted two distinguished physicists in this country who feel that your letter adds little to the discussion in Science of 1957-8.
Dingle's comment:
Now this was clearly quite beside the point. It was an answer, not a question, that could alone add anything to any discussion, and this question could in any case bear no relation to whatever discussion the editor had in mind, for the question had not been asked in 1957-8. [p.55-56]
Regarding publication in the Listener (another science journal) of a talk by Dingle:
At once two correspondents took me to task (how many more did so, of course, I do not know, but the letters of two were published in the same issue) for writing as I had done when I had failed to follow up in Nature 'the clarification which Professor Synge has achieved, to clinch the matter', as one put it. 'It seems to me,' wrote the other, 'it is Professor Dingle's clear duty to give an unambiguous answer.' This, of course, gave me the opportunity of explaining that my unambiguous answer clinching the matter had been languishing in Nature office (as it still does) for eleven months, and in the ensuing correspondence I was able to reveal other facts which have caused profound astonishment. [p.56]
Professor McRea, another prominent mathematician working in the field of relativity attempts a (public) refutation of Dingle's criticism. Dingle comments:
The relevant point of McCrea's answer - it contained much unnecessary mathematics - was that in my paraphrase of Einstein's (and correspondingly in my own) argument I had used the phrase, '[the clock] A must be held to read t1 at [the event] E1 ' - evidently, as the context shows, in the same sense as one might say 'the pavilion clock must read 6.30 at the drawing at stumps'. McCrea maintained that this rendered my argument 'meaningless' because 'A is not "at" E1 ' - as though the cricket rule was meaningless because the pavilion clock was not at the place where the stumps were to be drawn. Indeed, if this were a sound argument, it would clearly invalidate Einstein's argument as well as mine, and so discredit the theory in a different way; but I think no one could possibly have been misled by such a 'refutation' had it not been embedded in a lengthy mathematical matrix, including a wholly unnecessary 'Minkowski space-time diagram' to prove the impossibility of A ever being at the event E1 ' and so playing upon the innate conviction of most readers that the whole subject was a mystery comprehensible only to the mathematically initiated. [p.57]
Naturally, in the Listener discussion I was careful to avoid the phrase that could be so misread, and instead .... presented Einstein's proof from his theory that the readings of a clock P, passing along a row of relatively stationary synchronised clocks Q, fell steadily more and more behind those of the Q clocks as it went along. I then showed, in exactly the same way, that if P also was one of a row of relatively stationary synchronised clocks, each Q clock also must fall steadily behind the P clocks as it went along. Hence, as the motion progressed, every P clock was losing steadily with respect to the Q clocks, and vice versa. Einstein had not considered the second case, and so had not encountered the contradiction: he merely concluded, from the first alone, that P worked steadily slower than any arbitrarily selected Q clock, for the Q clocks, being synchronised, all worked at the same rate. [p.57]
From a further attempt by McRea to refute Dingle:
'Dingle's false step is that Dingle regards the situation treated by relativity as the symmetric comparison of one single clock with another identical single clock (in relative motion). This is not the situation... If we thus say that, according to relativity theory, a moving clock appears to go slow, then we are not making a symmetric comparison of one single clock with another single clock.'
Dingle's reply:
It is hard to know what comment to make on this: even Mr. Maddox, the editor of Nature (who had based his editorial, given in the Appendix, on McCrea's quite different 'refutation' of my criticism) had to write to me, 'I agree with you that what McCrea said is mystifying'. That is hardly the word I should use, but ' 'tis enough, 'twill serve'.
From Einstein and Infeld's book. The Evolution of Physics:
"When discussing measurements in classical mechanics, we used one clock for all C.S. [coordinate systems] Here we have many clocks in each C.S. This difference is unimportant. One clock was sufficient, but nobody could object to the use of many, so long as they behave as decent synchronised clocks should." [p.58]
Reply to Dingle from Professor J.M Ziman, Fellow of the Royal Society, a "teacher" of physics, who had been busy presenting himself as a champion of scientific integrity to the British Association (Ziman had assured them of the 'fierce and uncompromising honesty' of most scientists). Ziman tells Dingle regarding his criticism:
"Perhaps, in the end, you will have been proved right and I, with all my colleagues, wrong, and a sorry lot of fools we will seem. However, life is full of such gambles and I am prepared to take my chance on it."
Dingle's comment:
Again I must leave the reader to judge whether gambling on a matter clearly a subject for decision by the application of scientific principles can properly be described as 'fierce and uncompromising honesty'. [p.61]
John Maddox (the editor of Nature ) agrees to publish a "leader" and, finally, a short summary of Dingle's reply to Professor Synge, but never follows through, despite repeated assurances to both Dingle and Lord Soper that he would do so:
The leader, however, did not appear before the end of the year. As I had informed a number of enquirers of Mr. Maddox's intention, the perplexity aroused in them by its non-appearance led me to write him a few weeks later, asking when it might be expected. He replied on 21 January 1970 that "the article you mentioned is now almost ready'. It still, however, did not appear, and towards the end of March Lord Soper wrote to Mr. Maddox with a further inquiry on the matter, and received the reply that it would be 'a week or two' before the article was ready for publication. More than a week or two elapsed, however, without any sign of it, but the forthcoming election held matters up for a while, and it was not until 6 July that Lord Soper made a further inquiry. To this he received no reply. The article has still not appeared, nor has any reference at all to the issues raised in the Listener appeared in Nature.
These are the bare facts of the matter so far as Nature is concerned, though I should add that, after hearing that Mr. Maddox intended to publish a leader, I wrote him pointing out that unless it contained either a clear answer to my crucial question or an acknowledgement that, since none was possible, the theory must be abandoned, as Synge had stated, it would achieve nothing. The reader must interpret these facts for himself, but it is only fair to point out that it is utterly impossible for any human being to write authoritatively on the whole field of science which Nature must cover, and an editor is compelled to seek advice from experts on at least most of the matters with which he must deal. It is therefore at least a possibility that when Mr. Maddox promised to write his leader, he wrote in confidence that his experts on this subject would be able to provide him with an answer to my question. The fact that the leader has not appeared invites the speculation that they have not been able to do so. [p.61]
On 19 August 1970 the Rev. Dr. W. J. Platt, formerly General Secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society, submitted the following letter, of which he has kindly sent me a copy, for publication to The Times (an excerpt from the letter follows - it provides an excellent and succinct summary of the whole controversy. Writes Platt):
(1)Some of the most eminent workers in modern physics have admitted privately that they either do not understand the theory or regard it as nonsensical: nevertheless, they continue to teach it to students and to use it in high energy experiments.
(2) It is stated that the Royal Society has declared privately that Prof. Dingle's fallacy is 'too elementary even to be instructive', but the Society has not stated what the fallacy is, and the journal Nature , which had previously published the criticism without eliciting a refutation of it, has refused to publish a letter from Prof. Dingle, asking that the Royal Society shall state the fallacy.
(3) New Scientist , after asking Prof. Dingle to write an article on public dangers inherent in modern scientific research in which he would "not be restricted in any way', refused to publish the article offered, which stated these and similar facts, on the ground that 'refutation of a theory surely depends on the consensus of scientific opinion' - not now, it seems, on reasoned argument.
(4) After correspondence between Prof. Dingle and Prof. J. L. Synge, who, I understand, is an acknowledged mathematical authority on relativity, the latter in a letter published in Nature , agreed that the point at issue was not an abstruse mathematical one but concerned only the possible behaviour of clocks, and Synge 'cast his vote' for relativity. It is accepted that relativity, which concerns itself with matters of space and time, must be dependent on measurement of time, i.e. on clocks. Dingle replied that the matter was not to be decided by voting and that his demand of one clock was that it should not work both faster and slower at the same time than another. This reply was not allowed publication in Nature , a fact which led two correspondents in the Listener to assume that Dingle had not replied.
The situation thus disclosed, if the facts are as stated, is alarming. According to Dingle's closing letter (October 30) all that is required to settle the matter is an answer to the question: What is it, on Einstein's theory, that determines which of two clocks, relatively moving uniformly, lags behind the other, as Einstein says. Dingle's contention is that to be true the theory demands that the clocks must work faster and slower at the same time! It is therefore untenable. I repeat, Sir, that I make no attempt to judge the issue, but ask, in the public interest, since the foregoing assertions have been published and remain uncontradicted, that an authoritative and conclusive assurance shall be given that scientific integrity continues to exist.
Dingle comments:
Dr. Platt received a reply at once that the letter was under consideration. As, several weeks later, it had not appeared and he had heard nothing further, he wrote asking if a decision had been reached: he received no reply to this enquiry. The letter has not been published. [pp.62-63]
Chapter 5 - Attitude of the 'Elder Statesmen'
It is otherwise with the older physicists. These were sufficiently grounded in the fundamental principles of science to realise that the new conceptions - space turning into time, and so on - were meaningless, but they could not challenge them without facing the counter-challenge of giving a better interpretation of the mathematics. This was easy enough with special relativity alone - Lorentz, in fact, had done it, and, as we shall see, from 1904 until 1919 the 'relativity theory' was generally ascribed to Lorentz, not to Einstein. But with the apparent success in 1919 of Einstein's general theory with its then quite new and terrifying mathematical machinery of tensor calculus, came the fatal climax. Almost overnight 'the relativity theory of Lorentz' became 'Einstein's special relativity theory', and it was immediately hailed as such by the mathematical experts. The established physicists, therefore, had to face the alternatives of accepting, without understanding, the metaphysics of the newly christened 'Einstein's special theory', or mastering tensor calculus sufficiently to show that the so-called general relativity theory was not necessarily a generalisation of the earlier Einstein form of the 'relativity theory', and therefore carried with it no justification of 'Einstein's special relativity theory' (this is explained in detail in Part Two). They chose the former alternative. They gave up trying to understand the whole business, surrendered the use of their intelligence, and accepted passively whatever apparent absurdities the mathematicians put before them. [p.64]
They had the seeming excuse that the mathematical equations worked. They could use their accustomed electromagnetic equations, which by themselves gave the wrong experimental results, and apply 'the relativity correction', whereupon they gave the right experimental results. They accordingly ignored the physically intelligible (though, of course, not necessarily true) interpretation given by Lorentz - that the electromagnetic equations were incomplete since they failed to include a postulated effect of the ether on bodies moving through it - and simply went on with their experiments, accepting and confessing their inability to make any sense of waves interfering with one another in a strictly specified way in a medium which nevertheless did not exist, and other such mysteries, and leaving the mathematicians free to propose any interpretation they wished of their mathematical symbols, regardless of physical absurdity. [p.64]
My purpose, I repeat, is not a personal one (indeed, I have no right to blame them, for I myself was for long at fault for failing to recognise that the mathematics of the time was simply another form of mediaeval logic restored to its old position of authority over experience. I offer no excuse for this, nor do I regard my own intellectual pilgrimage as of sufficient general importance to relate here the course it took and how later I awoke from my dogmatic slumber. Shutting the eyes when the fact is pointed out is, of course, quite another matter), but solely that of showing, beyond all possibility of doubt, that the now prevailing state of mind in the world of physical science, which controls the future of our material civilisation, is directly opposed to the moral principles of science, and is fraught with the greatest danger to the future of mankind. [p.65]
Lord Rutherford .... could be more accurately described as scornful than as critical of the relativity theory.... [p.65]
Professor (Lord) Blackett, soon to be the latest President of the Royal Society, who in his own words had "taught the special theory for many years to our first-year students." writes to Dingle regarding a well intended, but irrelevant reply to Dingle's criticism by eminent relativist, Max Born:
I confess I cannot completely follow the details of yours and Max Born's argument, or rather, I have not had the time or inclination to do so. But to my superficial knowledge of the subject, there is nothing obviously wrong with the ordinary formulation.
Dingle's comment:
[Blackett] had merely accepted uncritically the opinions of others who had only theoretical (which in this case meant mathematical) acquaintance with the theory, while the essence of my criticism, as he would have seen if he had consented to look at it, applied not to the mathematics but to the physical interpretation of the mathematics. [p.66]
The reply of Blackett, now President of the Royal Society, to Dingle's request for publication:
I am very sorry to say that I do not feel able to communicate your paper for publication. I have looked back at a lot of the old correspondence about other discussions between you and Officers of the Society on related ideas. This confirms my decision.
Dingle's comment:
.... when Blackett refers to the discussions between me and the Officers of the Society on related ideas, he can have seen only the referees' reports on my papers and possibly my replies to them; he cannot have seen the papers themselves because they were returned to me. Since comments without knowledge of the material on which they were made must necessarily be beyond possibility of appraisal, I cannot see how they could have confirmed his decision regarding this new paper unless that decision also was arrived at without reference to its contents. [pp.66-67]
The difference between the more responsible, first-class minds .... and the general run of 'experimenters' who form the great majority, is that the former have the insight to perceive and the candour to acknowledge the fact (would that the revelation would come to them that the theory appears to them to be nonsense because it is nonsense and not because they are too stupid to understand it!) while the latter utter meaningless phrases like 'time dilation’ and think they are saying something profound. [ p.67]
Dingle refers to a reply from Sir Lawrence Bragg, physicist and X-ray crystallographer:
As in every such case, the word 'relativity' had produced the familiar conditioned reflex. It would be almost an impertinence to say that Sir Lawrence Bragg is far more than intelligent enough to realise immediately that a theory that requires one clock to work steadily both faster and slower than another, must be wrong, and that if special relativity is to be acceptable it must be defended against the charge that it requires such an impossibility. Yet, such is the state to which even the leading physicists have been reduced, that the mere mention of the word 'relativity' makes it impossible for him to perceive such an obvious fact. It at once conjures up a dread image, compelling an instant, unreasoning retreat, and automatically transforms a simple ethical question into the semblance of an esoteric intellectual one .... The fact that, nevertheless, a request for assistance in restoring integrity in science can be read as a request to 'try to distinguish between the two sides' on a particular scientific point I can only regard as one more example of the evil spell cast by the word 'relativity' - a word that immediately reduces the mental power of even leading physicists to impotence and is the greatest stumbling-block to my efforts to bring home to them the extreme seriousness of the state to which we have been reduced. Apart from that word-magic, there is nothing in the whole course of events which I related which might not have happened if 'crystallography' had been substituted for 'relativity' .... [pp.70-71]
Bragg in a letter to Dingle:
It seems to me that you have had a very fair and patient hearing from a number of people who are competent experts. I trust their judgement and I think no useful service to science is done by reopening the correspondence. I think it best to be frank.
Dingle feels compelled to point out his own credentials:
The .... point is embarrassing, and I would willingly omit it but for the fact that it is compulsory for me to present the situation faithfully and completely, no matter what that might involve, and the tenor of Sir Lawrence's letter, which is that of one written to a misguided, though perhaps well-meaning, ignoramus whose delusions have received sufficient, if not over-generous, attention, forces me to state the following facts ....
I cannot, of course, compare my qualifications directly with those of the competent and trustworthy experts [alluded to by Bragg], for they are unnamed, nor can I defend my judgement against theirs, for I cannot by any means ascertain what the grounds for theirs may be, and I am not allowed to ask for them through the Royal Society or Nature or any other person or agency that I know of; I am told only that my fallacy is so elementary that it is not even instructive and that the Royal Society would make itself ridiculous if it published the grounds of my criticism ....
Sir Lawrence's sole concern is with the fact that I have had 'fair and patient hearing' by other people - which I have never denied. Indeed, I have little doubt that they have tried long and patiently to think of a way of dealing with the problem I have set them. On the vitally important fact - that I have had no reply to my patiently heard question, which could have been given in a sentence if a reply had been possible - he makes no comment at all, and there is nothing to suggest that the need for a reply has occurred to him ....
To the best of my knowledge there is no one now living who can give objective evidence that he is more competent in the subject than I am, and I can only conjecture Sir Lawrence's reason for regarding as untrustworthy my judgement on a matter on which he disclaims all title to form a judgement of his own ....
During the following half-century I have studied intensively the field of investigation to which it belongs, and discussed the theory with practically all those physicists whose names are best known in connection with it — Einstein, Eddington, Tolman, Whittaker, Schrodinger, Born, Bridgman, to name but a few: I knew some of them intimately ....
I could continue in this vein, but it is distasteful and, moreover, I consider that the question should be decided on its intrinsic merits and not by a comparison of personal records. [pp.71,72,73]
Referring again to Bragg:
Why, then, I ask again, does he now, suddenly, without any critical examination at all (which, with all due respect to his modesty, I have not the slightest doubt that he is perfectly capable of making, and would make if he had not already taken it for granted that anything to do with relativity - a subject which Lord Blackett considered suitable fare for first-year undergraduates - must be to him an impenetrable mystery) straightway stigmatise my judgement as untrustworthy and consider that, since it has already been ignored with all due politeness, no useful service to science would be done by anyone taking any further notice of it or allowing me to say anything more on the matter?
I can conceive of only one reason - that my judgement does not reach the orthodox conclusion; and, that being so, it may be dismissed without further attention: Special relativity must be right because trustworthy experts say so: the experts are trustworthy because, they say that special relativity is right, and I am untrustworthy because I deny it. It is a perfect example of a circular argument.
If this is the true explanation - and I can conceive of no other - then Sir Lawrence Bragg has committed the cardinal sin of the scientist. He has closed his mind to the possibility that the theory of the moment, however plausible, might be wrong, and those experts, however competent, are fallible. He has forgotten that the final arbiters in science are experience and reason, and that the judgement of human authorities must be submitted for their approval, and that due retribution will unfailingly follow if this duty is not fulfilled. Like Lord Blackett, he has acquiesced in the neglect of this duty, and blindly given his allegiance to the ipse dixits of those whose pronouncements I have already related - to that of Max Born, who had nothing but praise for my exposition of special relativity, but refused to read my criticism of it after 25 years of further study because, since he knew the theory was right, it necessarily followed that I had made 'some elementary mistake'; to that of Synge, who 'casts a vote' that special relativity is right; to that of Ziman, who 'gambles' on its being right; and to those of other 'authorities' which are equally at variance with the genuine canons of scientific judgement. The fact that no one submits my simple question to the arbitration of reason he ignores, accepting the verdict of dogma, of the majority of 'experts', of chance, of anything but the only judge whose authority true science recognises. To the action of the editor of Nature in abruptly closing a correspondence at a point at which a single communication, submitted but withheld from publication, would have settled the question conclusively but unpalatably, he gives his approval, holding that 'no useful service to science' would be done by allowing the communication to appear. [pp.73,74,75]
Dingle's question to Bragg (note the comparison he makes of the general response to his criticism and dogmatism):
(1)Why do you consider it compatible with the ethical principles of science that an objective scientific question should be automatically closed to further inquiry when it has been dismissed unanswered by the ex cathedra judgement of human ‘authorities’?
(2) Why, having decided that such closure is ethically justifiable, do you accept the judgement of those who refuse to give reasons for it, and reject that of one having at least equal qualifications in the subject, who gives reasons for his judgement in which no fault has been found? [p.76]
Again to Bragg:
I couldn't agree more both that physicists are 'convinced that s.r. is right' and that I should not 'accuse the other party of lack of scientific integrity'. On the first point, it is simply because they are convinced that it is right that their minds are closed to the possibility that it might be wrong. There are two kinds of integrity: (1) the practice of asserting only what you believe; (2) keeping your mind open to the possibility that what you believe may be wrong. They have the first kind all right; the second - what Dale referred to as 'not neglecting any anomaly' - is now, in this matter, a dead letter. That needs no further proof than the fact stated in my Introduction, that more than a decade's persistent attempts to elicit the one sentence needed to dispose of my anomaly have all failed. Your 'very simple direct physical proof that the clock is going at a different rate' is a matter of common agreement. But it stops there. When I ask which clock goes faster (for you can't have clocks going at different rates without one going faster than the other), and why, I get no answer. So what is their 'conviction' worth?
One the second point - that I should not accuse the other party of lack of scientific integrity - I have been most careful not to do so. I have simply stated the bare facts and left the judgement of them to the reader. That, for instance, is why I have asked my .... questions of you, so that I can report your answers, not make charges of my own, or the absence of answers if that should be the case. [p.77]
To Bragg on the suppression by Maddox of Dingle's reply to Synge:
Maddox closes down the discussion with Synge when it reaches a point where a decision is inevitable, and has suppressed my decisive reply for three years (it is still unpublished), during which two Listener correspondents (goodness knows how many more, but two letters were published) call me to task for not answering Synge. That is verifiable fact, not my accusation. Maddox assures Lord Soper and me time and again that he will deal with the matter in a long leader 'in a week or two': after 18 months it has still not appeared. The reader can judge that, but the fact is verifiable. And so on, and so on. [p.77]
From my knowledge of them, there is not one of the 'authorities' who has the moral stamina to face the humiliation that, after his evasions for so many years, would inescapably attend his coming clean now, and I have not been able to persuade any of those who have the guts of the need to force the 'authorities' to answer my question with patent straightforward honesty. [p.78]
Dingle refers to the misguided and vociferous attempts of physics students to address his criticism:
It will suffice to say that this is, in one respect, the most saddening aspect of the whole matter, for it is evident that the students have been trained, consciously or unconsciously, to believe that criticism of special relativity is a sure sign of ignorance, not to say stupidity, on the part of the critic, and I have been informed, with various degrees of tolerance, of fallacies that I had learnt to outgrow before the fathers of my instructors were born; only comparatively rarely have I been asked questions for information. [p.78]
I have called this book Science at the Crossroads because science has indeed now two courses before it: it can, on the one hand, resume progress along the course which Dale, generalising from its past history, believed it still to be following, or it can, on the other hand, remain on the path which I hope I have enabled the reader to see that it is now pursuing. The consequences of the choice are important beyond measure. [p.80]
.... were I still in my former position and a suitable student were available, I should set him the problem of studying, and presenting the results as a thesis for a doctorate, the development of physics during the last hundred years or so, with the special object of tracing the steps by which physics, the scope and character of which was once understood clearly enough, gradually became enslaved to mathematics and metaphysics until its present state of almost complete unconscious subordination to those subjects was arrived at. [p.81]